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THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:
GOOD INTENTIONS HEADED IN THE
WRONG DIRECTION
Lawrence J. White*
I. Introduction
The heavy hand of nineteenth century populism continues to have a
powerful effect on late twentieth century banking policy in the United
States. The American political system persists in treating banks as
all-powerful financial institutions that must be shackled economically
and, simultaneously, as hugely wealthy institutions from which sub-
stantial tribute can be levied.
Although reality is otherwise, the populist rhetoric and imagery
dominate policy. The shackles are widespread: commercial banks' ac-
tivities in the securities and investment banking area are severely lim-
ited by the Glass-Steagall Act;' the ability of banks to own and
operate businesses beyond a narrow range of financial services is re-
stricted by the Bank Holding Company Acts of 1956 and 1970;2 the
ability of banks to operate freely on an interstate basis (i.e., to estab-
lish full-fledged local branches) is restricted by the McFadden Act of
1927 and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956;1 some states still place limitations on the ability of banks
to branch within their states; and many states impose limitations on
the fees that banks can charge for various services.
The major vehicle for extracting tribute is the Community Rein-
vestment Act of 19771 ("CRA" or "the Act"). The Act places an
obligation on commercial banks and on savings and loan associations
("S&Ls") and savings banks (S&Ls and savings banks are frequently
described as "thrifts") to "meet the credit needs of the local commu-
nities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such institutions." The Act offers no greater precision
for these phrases, and the task of fleshing them out and enforcing
them has been left to the bank and thrift regulatory agencies. The
* Arthur E. Imperatore Professor of Economics and Department Chairman, Leo-
nard N. Stem School of Business, New York University.
1. The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name for sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the
Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
2. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1843, 1849 (1988); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5111-5112 (1988).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988); 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988).
4. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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vagueness of the term "credit needs" easily lends itself to an open-
ended "wish list" approach by community organizations that lobby
regulators. Richard Marsico's accompanying Article in this journal'
exemplifies this "wish list" approach.
The CRA approach is fundamentally flawed; it rests on a rapidly
crumbling foundation. In essence, either it is redundant, because
serving the local community is profitable anyway; or it requires cross-
subsidy, with above-normal profits from other services subsidizing the
losses from the unprofitable service to the local community. In this
latter case, the fresh winds of financial services competition are in-
creasingly erasing any above-normal profits that might be earned on
other services. Consequently, the basis for the cross-subsidy is rapidly
disappearing, and banks will either shirk their CRA obligations or
will incur overall losses - a result that conflicts with the CRA lan-
guage, "consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institu-
tions." Further, in the long run, the CRA obligations will cause
banks to try to exit unprofitable communities completely, rather than
to remain and offer a limited range of potentially profitable services;
and banks will tend to avoid entering any such communities. Finally,
in a world of increasingly global markets for financial services, the
CRA's emphasis on localism is anachronistic and ultimately self-de-
feating for the reasons just stated.
A major theme will pervade this Essay: the rising pressures of com-
petition in financial services. This increased competition is surely
beneficial for consumers generallyand for the health of the U.S. econ-
omy. It provides a widening array of financial services at lower costs
and higher yields. But this increased competition also severely under-
mines regulatory efforts, such as the CRA, that try to channel banks'
activities in specific directions or areas. Because these competitive
pressures will not disappear and are likely to continue to grow
stronger, sound public policy should recognize the limitations that
they impose on such regulatory efforts. More suitable alternatives
should be devised for achieving the goals that motivate the CRA. In-
deed, the reduction of the remaining regulatory barriers to greater
financial services competition should be part of a new approach.
The remainder of this Essay will expand on these ideas. Part II
5. Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165 (1993); see also Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvest-
ment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, But Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed,
20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293 (1993); Wendy Pelle, Housing Activist Groups Continuing to
Push CRA, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Nov. 30, 1992, at 15; Ted Cornwell, Housing Ac-
tivist Groups Continuing to Push CRA But CRA Is 'Not Enough', NAT'L MORTGAGE
NEWS, Nov. 30, 1992, at 15.
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provides the main argument that the CRA is ill-advised. Part III asks
why the political system remains so attached to the "shackle them
and exact tribute from them" approach to banks. And Part IV offers
a conclusion, including some sensible alternatives to the CRA.
II. The Basic Argument: The CRA is Ill-Advised
In the 1970s banks in some communities were perceived to be re-
luctant to provide loans or other financial services to specific neigh-
borhoods or areas - almost always low-income central city
neighborhoods, with a high proportion of black or other minority res-
idents and low or declining property values. Bank managers were
said to have literally or figuratively drawn red lines on maps around
neighborhoods in which they would not lend.6 It was this perception
that led to the enactment in 1977 of the CRA, which obligated banks
to meet the credit needs of their communities.
It is clear that for most banks in most communities the CRA is
redundant. They serve their communities well, or at least adequately,
as is evidenced by a relative absence of CRA complaints from the
affected communities. They do so because they find this service prof-
itable. But the CRA still means extra costly paperwork for banks.
Additionally, bank executives must always operate in fear that some
organization or group of customers will claim that their "needs" are
not being adequately met. Community groups' notions of "needs"
can become quite elastic, with little acknowledgement of the roles of
prices and costs; again, Professor Marsico's Article provides a good
example of this elasticity.
Still, it is communities that claim that they are not being adequately
served - that they are being redlined - where the CRA is supposed
to have its impact. An immediate question then arises: Why are
banks not providing the desired services to these communities?
There are a number of possible answers. First, banks may be prac-
ticing conscious or unconscious discrimination against one or more
minority groups that are heavily represented among the residents of
the community and whose members would in fact be profitable cus-
tomers. 7 If this is so, the problem is one of racial or ethnic discrimi-
6. A number of studies making these claims are summarized in GEORGE J. BEN-
STON ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MORTGAGE REDLINING (1978).
7. Discrimination against minority groups in home mortgage lending has become an
issue of great concern in the early 1990s. A recent, careful study by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston shows that, even after the important credit characteristics of loan appli-
cants are taken into account, lenders' rejection rates for black and Hispanic loan appli-
cants are significantly higher than for white applicants. See Alicia H. Munnell et al.,
1993]
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nation, and it is best solved directly through more vigorous
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.
Second, banks may simply be neglecting profitable opportunities -
perhaps because of ignorance, carelessness, or laziness. If this were
true, then CRA might be giving banks a push in the direction that
their self-interest should be taking them anyway. Perhaps in 1977,
when banks enjoyed more legal and economic protection from com-
petitors, bank managers were more prone to a quiet life and to forgo-
ing profitable opportunities. This relaxed style of banking seems
much less likely to occur in the more competitive 1990s. In any
event, the real solution to this phenomenon (if it is important) is a set
of policies to encourage more competition in financial services - not
the shackling and extracting policies, of which the CRA is a promi-
nent part, that can ultimately reduce competition.
Third, banks located in a community that they perceive to be in
decline may be reluctant to make mortgage loans to homebuyers or
commercial loans to businesses in that community, for fear that bor-
rowers will not be able to repay their loans fully and that the bank
consequently will suffer losses. However, there may be an externality
or spillover effect at work here. In an urban area, the decline or lack
of upkeep of one property (e.g., a home, an apartment building, or a
commercial facility) can have negative effects on the values of neigh-
boring properties; conversely, an improvement in one property can
benefit the others. But individual parties who focus on their private
benefit-cost calculations will tend to ignore such spillover effects on
others. Accordingly, owners may neglect maintenance or upkeep of
properties based on their private benefit-cost calculations, even
though the aggregate community benefits of their actions could ex-
ceed those private costs.
This proposition applies not only to the owners of properties but
also to lenders on those properties: each bank's decision concerning
the making of a loan on a property (e.g., to finance improvements)
will be based on its private calculation as to the likelihood that the
loan will be repaid and will ignore the effects on neighboring proper-
ties. Consequently, each bank's reluctance to lend to individual par-
ties in a community that it perceives to be in decline will reinforce
other banks' reluctance to lend and thus will increase the probability
that the community will indeed decline.'
Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data, Working Paper No. 92-7, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston (Oct. 1992).
8. This point is addressed in JACK M. GUTrENTAG AND SUSAN M. WACHTER,
REDLINING AND PUBLIC POLICY (1980), and in Michael Lamb, The Deregulation of
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If, instead, the banks could coordinate their lending decisions, they
might find that their joint lending could arrest the community's de-
cline and make their loans jointly profitable;9 in essence, each bank
would benefit from the lending decisions of the other banks. The nec-
essary vehicle here is a coordinating agency - either governmental or
private - that can reassure each bank that the other banks are part of
the community lending program. Without this coordinating agency
the CRA is unlikely to be sufficient; and with this agency the CRA is
largely unnecessary.
Fourth, banks may simply find the service to be unprofitable ° be-
cause its costs and/or risks are too high. In such cases (in the absence
of the three phenomena mentioned above) banks cannot meet their
CRA obligations to provide such services unless they are able to earn
above-normal profits on their operations elsewhere, thereby making
up for the losses in the CRA-induced area. In essence, banks must be
able to cross-subsidize internally the CRA-induced services; otherwise
the banks will incur overall losses or earn inadequate profits.
In this respect it is important to note that, so long as the CRA-
induced services are otherwise unprofitable, banks will always want to
shirk their CRA obligations. Even if excess profits elsewhere were
available for internal cross-subsidy, banks would be better off if they
did not incur the losses on the CRA-induced services.
Even more important, in the increasingly competitive financial
services world of the 1990s, the areas in which banks can hope to earn
above-normal profits are rapidly disappearing. Changes in state and
federal laws are reducing the protections against competition among
themselves that banks used to enjoy. Further, rapid improvements in
the basic technologies of financial services - data processing and tele-
communications - have allowed banks to extend the geographic and
product scope of their services, again increasing competition among
themselves. These same improvements have allowed non-banks to de-
velop loan and investment products that compete with banks' core
loan and deposit services. Consequently, commercial banks now face
competition in one or more of their services from S&Ls, savings
Banking?, in THE DEREGULATION OF BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES (Law-
rence G. Goldberg and Lawrence J. White eds., 1979).
9. Of course, this turnaround may not always be possible. The community's decline
may be occurring for fundamental reasons, and the correction of the externality among
lenders may not be sufficient to offset these factors. In this case even joint lending will be
unprofitable.
10. The bank need not incur losses for the service to be unprofitable; it is sufficient for
the bank to earn less than a normal, competitive return on the capital invested in the
activity.
1993] 285
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
banks, credit unions, mortgage banking firms,"' consumer credit com-
panies, industrial credit companies, insurance companies, pension
funds, mutual funds, investment banking firms,12 and non-financial
companies (e.g., AT&T, Sears, General Electric, General Motors,
Ford) that have entered the credit card market. Table 113 provides a
clear picture of the diminished role of banks in supplying the primary
financial service - the granting of credit - that is the focus of the
CRA. As the table indicates, commercial banks now account for less
than a quarter of all credit extended and outstanding to the rest of the
U.S. economy, and banks and thrifts together (the only two classes of
lenders covered by CRA) account for less than a third of the total. If
equity investments as a substitute for debt were included in the totals,
the banks' share would be less than a sixth, and the combined banks'
and thrifts' shares would be well below a quarter.
There are, of course, some communities where banks are relatively
important. And there are some categories of loan services, such as
loans to small business borrowers, in which banks face relatively less
competition from other lenders. Accordingly, in local markets where
banks are relatively few, existing banks may be able to earn above-
competitive profits on these types of loans.14 Nevertheless, the gen-
eral picture is one of increasing competition and thus of a reduced
possibility of excess profits "elsewhere" to cross-subsidize unprofitable
CRA-induced services.
An example from another regulatory area may help clarify this
point. In response to regulatory pressures, AT&T practiced cross-
subsidy in its pricing of telephone services from the 1930s through the
1970s. Large profits were earned in heavily used long-distance city-
pair markets, which were used to make up for deficient or non-exis-
tent profits on lightly used long-distance city-pairs and on local ser-
vice.I So long as AT&T had a monopoly over long-distance service,
this cross-subsidy was feasible. When competitive entry by MCI,
Sprint, and other new long-distance carriers eroded the profit margins
in the heavily used city-pair markets, this pattern of internal cross-
11. Mortgage banking firms are companies that originate mortgages and quickly sell
them in the secondary market.
12. Investment banking firms, by helping corporations sell their securities directly to
investors, thereby encourage these corporations to bypass banks as sources of finance.
13. See infra at 292.
14. There is thus a valid continuing role for antitrust scrutiny of bank mergers.
15. See William A. Brock and David S. Evans, Creamskimming, in BREAKING UP
BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (David S. Evans ed.,
1983); ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFrER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
A MORE COMPETITIVE ERA (1991).
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subsidy became increasingly difficult to maintain. It finally ceased
with the antitrust separation of AT&T's long distance services from
the local Bell operating companies in 1984.
Similarly, the rising competition among banks and between banks
and non-bank providers of financial services is eroding the above-nor-
mal profits that banks may have previously earned in their protected
market niches and must doom any scheme that relies on internal
cross-subsidy.
Further, as banks and thrifts consider the possibilities of entry and
exit over time, they will surely avoid entering areas where they fear
that CRA obligations will be onerous, and they will try to exit these
types of areas whenever possible. On the former point, it is worth
noting that when Freedom National Bank, headquartered in Harlem,
New York City, became insolvent in 1990 and was seized by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the FDIC could find
no other bank or thrift that was willing to take over Freedom's opera-
tions, even when the FDIC promised to cover the losses on Freedom's
bad loans. Consequently, Freedom was permanently closed and liqui-
dated, and residents of Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant (where Free-
dom had a branch) subsequently have had fewer banking services
available to them. When Goldome Bank failed in 1991, the FDIC
was able to attract only one bank to take over its Harlem branches. It
seems likely that a contributing factor in the reluctance of other insti-
tutions to take over Freedom's and Goldome's banking operations
were their fears of CRA obligations.
In sum, rapid improvements in data processing and telecommuni-
cations are widening the markets for many financial services to re-
gional, national, or even international boundaries. The CRA's
emphasis on localism is increasingly anachronistic, ultimately futile,
and even counter-productive. The U.S. economy is not well served by
the CRA.
III. Why Are Banks Treated So Differently?
Few other enterprises in the U.S. economy are saddled with a legal
obligation to serve their local communities. Indeed, even among the
many types of providers of financial services mentioned in Part II,
only banks and thrifts are burdened with a CRA obligation. All other
financial services providers can choose to offer services in a commu-
nity as they see fit. Why are banks treated so differently?
There seem to be a number of reasons. First, banks have histori-
cally wielded a great deal of economic power. Early in the nineteenth
1993]
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century commercial banks were virtually the only sources of finance; 16
as late as 1900 they still accounted for over 50% of the assets of all
financial intermediaries, and the combination of commercial banks,
savings institutions, and trust companies accounted for over 75% of
the total. Though commercial banks' share of overall lending has
steadily declined throughout the twentieth century to less than a
quarter of all credit extended in today's economy, 7 memories linger.
Furthermore, banks remain the largest identifiable group of lenders in
an increasingly diverse financial system.
Second, banks are among the few types of firms in the marketplace
that do not automatically respond "yes, how many do you want?"
when a potential customer expresses interest in their product."i A
bank's primary revenue-generating product is a loan, which must be
repaid with interest in order for the bank to earn a profit. For this
reason the bank's loan officers must exercise judgment as to the
probabilities of repayment when deciding on the size and terms of a
loan and to whom it will be made. 19 This exercise of judgment ap-
pears to give the bank a great deal of power.
In the nineteenth century, when banks were the predominant lend-
ing institutions and when the limits of data processing and telecom-
munications meant that financial markets were geographically
circumscribed, a local bank was more likely to have a monopoly and
actually to be able to exercise market power.2 ° In the 1990s, a local
bank is much less likely to have market power, and a competitive
16. These data are found in ROBERT LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? (1987).
17. See Table 1, infra at 292.
18. Insurance companies are the other major category of enterprises that exercise
judgment in the sale of their services.
19. A bank is considerably less finicky about its deposit customers, unless it fears that
a checking account customer might overdraw his or her account (which would either
place the bank in a loan relationship with the customer or generate extra costs for the
bank to avoid doing so).
20. Paradoxically, many states' nineteenth century shackling efforts, by restricting
bank branching, increased many local banks' market power, since those banks did not
have to fear that other banks would branch into their communities. One explanation for
this paradox is reminiscent of late twentieth century CRA efforts. By preventing banks
from branching, the community hoped that it was thereby confining the bank to doing
business in the community, in bad times as well as good ones. In essence, branching
restrictions were seen as an insurance policy for the community, and the consequent mar-
ket power and monopoly rents for the local bank were the insurance "premiums" that the
local community paid for the policy. (The community might then try to reduce those
premiums through usury ceilings or other limitations on the bank's behavior.) For an
expansion of this argument, see Charles W. Calomiris, Regulation, Industrial Structure,
and Instability in US. Banking: An Historical Perspective, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN
BANKING (Michael Klausner and Lawrence J. White eds., 1993).
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marketplace will discipline lenders' foolish judgments. 2' But the indi-
vidual judgments of loan officers, even of competitive banks, continue
to appear to convey great power; and this appearance feeds the rheto-
ric of shackling and extracting.
Third, banks have always been perceived as special because of the
special nature of their liabilities: deposits. From the beginning of the
republic in the late eighteenth century, government regulation of
banks has had as one of its primary goals the preservation of the
safety and soundness of banks through, for example, limitations on
banks' activities and investments. The purposes of this regulatory ef-
fort have been to protect the depositors in those banks, to prevent de-
positor runs on banks, and generally to protect the payments
mechanism of the economy, which involves the movement of deposits
among banks. Since 1933 federal deposit insurance has added an extra
element of "specialness" to banks. Though this special nature (which
applies equally to thrifts and credit unions) is based on banks' liabili-
ties, the aura of specialness has carried over to their lending and,
again, has fed the rhetoric of shackling and extracting.
Fourth, as the numbers of failed commercial banks, S&Ls, and sav-
ings banks have mounted in the 1980s and early 1990s22 the media
have continually used the terms "bailout" and "rescue" to describe
the regulators' actions in seizing the insolvent institutions, liquidating
them or finding acquirers for them, and absorbing their losses as part
of the deposit insurance process. The general public now believes that
taxpayer moneys are being used to "bail out the banks and the S&Ls"
and that local communities deserve something in return from "the
banks and the S&Ls." In actuality, the moneys are being used to sat-
isfy the federal government's deposit insurance obligations to the de-
positors in the insolvent institutions;23 and the remaining healthy
institutions are not the beneficiaries.24 Nevertheless, the rhetoric of
21. But a predilection by virtually all lenders to discriminate against some types of
borrowers - as apparently is the case in mortgage lending - will not be cured by com-
petition. See supra note 7.
22. The total number of such failures now exceeds 2,000.
23. For a more complete discussion, see LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE:
PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991).
24. Banks and thrifts pay deposit insurance premiums, which in 1992 were 23 cents
per $100 of deposits; in 1993 they will vary between 23 cents and 31 cents, depending on
the FDIC's assessment of the riskiness of the institution. Arguably, in the past these
premiums were too low, especially for high-risk S&Ls, since the accumulated premiums
paid were woefully inadequate to cover the asset shortfalls of the (subsequently) insolvent
S&Ls. However, the primary beneficiaries were the owners of the high-risk S&Ls and
their customers. A good case could be made that the current premiums are too high for
adequately capitalized, conservatively managed banks and thrifts. See, e.g., Barbara A.
Rehm, FDIC May Widen Premium Range After Trial Run of Risk-Based Plan, AM.
2891993]
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"bailout" persists, and the notion that communities deserve some-
thing in return follows close behind.
In sum, a set of largely false images and impressions continues to
characterize banks. In this light, the public policy insistence that
banks serve "the needs" of their local communities is understandable.
The reality of banks' current position in the U.S. economy, however,
argues strongly for a different approach.
IV. Conclusion
If the CRA is the wrong direction for public policy, are there viable
alternatives? I believe that the answer is "yes" and that these alterna-
tives would provide a more direct approach to the problems that the
CRA and its current proponents try to address.
First, to the extent that racial or other types of personal discrimina-
tion in lending is perceived to be the problem, more vigorous enforce-
ment of antidiscrimination laws - notably the Equal Opportunity
Credit Act of 197523 - is the best solution. This approach has the
double advantage of being more direct than the CRA and of covering
all lenders, not just the banks and thrifts. Tougher enforcement
should be combined with increased education and training of lenders'
line personnel. The use of matched pair "testers" (individuals who
pose as potential customers) is likely to be a valuable tool of enforce-
ment, to support the investigation of individual complaints and the
use of statistical analysis to detect discrimination. 6
Second, to the extent that the neighborhood externality or spillover
effects discussed in Part II are the problem, governments at all levels
should encourage the formation of public or private organizations
that can serve as coordinators and re-assurers of individual banks in
their lending functions. The banks themselves should be encouraged
to form consortia or syndicates to deal with these neighborhood exter-
nalities, although a proper concern for antitrust issues should also be
present.
Third, if there are transferable lessons to be learned from successful
lending efforts in low income communities,27 these lessons should be
disseminated as effectively as possible - for example, through semi-
BANKER, Dec. 16, 1992, at 1 (quoting George French, Associate Director of FDIC's
research division); see also T.W. Epps et al., New Rules Penalize Prudently Managed
Banks, AM. BANKER, Jan. 19, 1993, at 4.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1988).
26. See Claudia Cummins, Sound Off, AM. BANKER, Nov. 30, 1992.
27. For example, the South Shore Bank of Chicago has apparently been successful in
making profitable loans to low income inner-city communities.
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nars sponsored by bank and thrift regulators. Further, policies to en-
courage greater competition in the provision of financial services -
for example, by making interstate branching easier - should decrease
the likelihood that lazy, incompetent, or inefficient bankers are forgo-
ing the opportunity to provide profitable service in these communities.
Finally, to the extent that there is a public purpose to be served in
the provision of financial services to communities that banks (or any
other lender) do not find profitable, this argument should be made
directly, and public moneys - i.e., direct government subsidies -
should be used to ensure the provision of these services.28 Though
government policy in the U.S. has a long and not very honorable tra-
dition of trying to avoid open and direct subsidies by trying instead to
force regulated firms to provide the same transfers through internal
cross-subsidy,29 policies that are more open and transparent are surely
a superior form of government.
Requiring a largely competitive banking system to provide these
unprofitable financial services through internal cross-subsidy is inap-
propriate, inefficient, and ultimately a recipe for frustration and futil-
ity. There are better ways.
28. This need not mean direct government provision of the services. Instead, selective
subsidies to private financial services providers can effectively "leverage" a smaller
amount of public funds to achieve a larger flow of services. Or government subsidies
could provide the "seed money" capital for specialized community development banks.29. In addition to the telecommunications example discussed in Part II, transporta-
tion (e.g., rail, truck, air, bus) is another area where government efforts at cross-subsidy
have been prevalent.
1993]
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Table 1: The Sources of Credit Market and Trade Credit Debt
Outstanding to the Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors of the
U.S. Economy, Yearend 19 9 1a
Source
Commercial banks
S&Ls and savings banks
Credit unions
Insurance companies
Pension and retirement
funds
Other financial sector lenders
Nonfinancial sector lenders
Amount
(billions)
$ 2,851
1,013
175
951
1,991
3,554c
Share of Lending
Total
23.4%
8.3
1.4
13.3
7.8
16.4
29.2
100.0%Total $12,158
aSource: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts.
bIncludes $52 billion in trade credit.
Clncludes $910 billion in trade credit.
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